I. LAYING PLANS


 1. Sun Tzu said:  The art of war is of vital importance
    to the State.

 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either
    to safety or to ruin.  Hence it is a subject of inquiry
    which can on no account be neglected.

 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant
    factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations,
    when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

 4. These are:  (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;
    (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete
    accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him
    regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

 7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,
    times and seasons.

 8. Earth comprises distances, great and small;
    danger and security; open ground and narrow passes;
    the chances of life and death.

 9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,
    sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.

10. By method and discipline are to be understood
    the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,
    the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
    of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the
    control of military expenditure.

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: 
    he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them
    not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking
    to determine the military conditions, let them be made
    the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued
        with the Moral law?
    (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
    (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven
        and Earth?
    (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
    (5) Which army is stronger?
    (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
    (7) In which army is there the greater constancy
        both in reward and punishment?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can
    forecast victory or defeat.

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts
    upon it, will conquer:  let such a one be retained in command! 
    The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,
    will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!

16. While heading the profit of my counsel,
    avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
    over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favorable,
    one should modify one's plans.

18. All warfare is based on deception.

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
    when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
    are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
    when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy.  Feign disorder,
    and crush him.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. 
    If he is in superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
    irritate him.  Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 
    If his forces are united, separate them.

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
    you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory,
    must not be divulged beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many
    calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. 
    The general who loses a battle makes but few
    calculations beforehand.  Thus do many calculations
    lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: 
    how much more no calculation at all!  It is by attention
    to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

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Chapter II. WAGING WAR

 1. Sun Tzu said:  In the operations of war,
    where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots,
    as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand
    mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them
    a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,
    including entertainment of guests, small items such as
    glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
    will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. 
    Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory
    is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and
    their ardor will be damped.  If you lay siege to a town,
    you will exhaust your strength.

 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources
    of the State will not be equal to the strain.

 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,
    your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,
    other chieftains will spring up to take advantage
    of your extremity.  Then no man, however wise,
    will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
    cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
    from prolonged warfare.

 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted
    with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand
    the profitable way of carrying it on.

 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,
    neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage
    on the enemy.  Thus the army will have food enough
    for its needs.

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army
    to be maintained by contributions from a distance. 
    Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes
    the people to be impoverished.

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
    prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's
    substance to be drained away.

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
    will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion
    of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
    and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;
    while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
    breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
    protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons,
    will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging
    on the enemy.  One cartload of the enemy's provisions
    is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise
    a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty
    from one's own store.

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must
    be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from
    defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots
    have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. 
    Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,
    and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. 
    The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment
    one's own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,
    not lengthy campaigns.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies
    is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it
    depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

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Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM


 1. Sun Tzu said:  In the practical art of war, the best
    thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
    to shatter and destroy it is not so good.  So, too, it is
    better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,
    to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire
    than to destroy them.

 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles
    is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists
    in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to
    balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent
    the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in
    order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
    and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it
    can possibly be avoided.  The preparation of mantlets,
    movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take
    up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over
    against the walls will take three months more.

 5. The general, unable to control his irritation,
    will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
    with the result that one-third of his men are slain,
    while the town still remains untaken.  Such are the disastrous
    effects of a siege.

 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
    troops without any fighting; he captures their cities
    without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
    without lengthy operations in the field.

 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery
    of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
    will be complete.  This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten
    to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,
    to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
    into two.

 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
    if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
    if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made
    by a small force, in the end it must be captured
    by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;
    if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will
    be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will
    be weak.

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
    misfortune upon his army:--

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,
    being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. 
    This is called hobbling the army.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the
    same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant
    of the conditions which obtain in an army.  This causes
    restlessness in the soldier's minds.

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army
    without discrimination, through ignorance of the
    military principle of adaptation to circumstances. 
    This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,
    trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. 
    This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging
    victory away.

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials
    for victory:
    (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when
        not to fight.
    (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior
        and inferior forces.
    (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
        spirit throughout all its ranks.
    (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
        the enemy unprepared.
    (5) He will win who has military capacity and is
        not interfered with by the sovereign.

18. Hence the saying:  If you know the enemy
    and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
    hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not the enemy,
    for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. 
    If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
    succumb in every battle.

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Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS


 1. Sun Tzu said:  The good fighters of old first put
    themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then
    waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our
    own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy
    is provided by the enemy himself.

 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
    but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

 4. Hence the saying:  One may know how to conquer
    without being able to do it.

 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
    ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
    strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the
    most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in
    attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. 
    Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;
    on the other, a victory that is complete.

 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken
    of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight
    and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
    to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;
    to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is
    one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation
    for wisdom nor credit for courage.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. 
    Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty
    of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
    already defeated.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into
    a position which makes defeat impossible, and does
    not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist
    only seeks battle after the victory has been won,
    whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights
    and afterwards looks for victory.

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
    and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is
    in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have,
    firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity;
    thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
    fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
    Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to
    Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation;
    and Victory to Balancing of chances.

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
    a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
    of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

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Chapter V. ENERGY


 1. Sun Tzu said:  The control of a large force
    is the same principle as the control of a few men: 
    it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

 2. Fighting with a large army under your command
    is nowise different from fighting with a small one: 
    it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand
    the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken--
    this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.

 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
    dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science
    of weak points and strong.

 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used
    for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
    in order to secure victory.

 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible
    as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
    like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
    like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

 7. There are not more than five musical notes,
    yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
    melodies than can ever be heard.

 8. There are not more than five primary colors
    (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination
    they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

 9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes
    (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations
    of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

10. In battle, there are not more than two methods
    of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two
    in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. 
    It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. 
    Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
    which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed
    swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy
    its victim.

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible
    in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
    decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
    be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;
    amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head
    or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,
    simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
    postulates strength.

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is
    simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under
    a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
    masking strength with weakness is to be effected
    by tactical dispositions.

19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy
    on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
    which the enemy will act.  He sacrifices something,
    that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
    then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
    energy, and does not require too much from individuals. 
    Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize
    combined energy.

22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting
    men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. 
    For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
    motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;
    if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
    round-shaped, to go rolling down.

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men
    is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain
    thousands of feet in height.  So much on the subject
    of energy.

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Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG


 1. Sun Tzu said:  Whoever is first in the field and
    awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
    whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle
    will arrive exhausted.

 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
    the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
    to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,
    he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
    if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;
    if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;
    march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

 6. An army may march great distances without distress,
    if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks
    if you only attack places which are undefended.You can
    ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
    positions that cannot be attacked.

 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose
    opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful
    in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy!  Through you
    we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
    and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible,
    if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire
    and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid
    than those of the enemy.

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced
    to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
    rampart and a deep ditch.  All we need do is attack
    some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent
    the enemy from engaging us even though the lines
    of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. 
    All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable
    in his way.

13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
    invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,
    while the enemy's must be divided.

14. We can form a single united body, while the
    enemy must split up into fractions.  Hence there will
    be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
    which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
    with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be
    made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
    against a possible attack at several different points;
    and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
    the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will
    be proportionately few.

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van,
    he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear,
    he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left,
    he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right,
    he will weaken his left.  If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
    he will everywhere be weak.

18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
    against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
    our adversary to make these preparations against us.

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,
    we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order
    to fight.

20. But if neither time nor place be known,
    then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right,
    the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van
    unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. 
    How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
    anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest
    are separated by several LI!

21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers
    of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
    them nothing in the matter of victory.  I say then
    that victory can be achieved.

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
    prevent him from fighting.  Scheme so as to discover
    his plans and the likelihood of their success.

23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his
    activity or inactivity.  Force him to reveal himself,
    so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,
    so that you may know where strength is superabundant
    and where it is deficient.

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
    you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,
    and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,
    from the machinations of the wisest brains.

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's
    own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
    but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
    is evolved.

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained
    you one victory, but let your methods be regulated
    by the infinite variety of circumstances.

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
    natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong
    and to strike at what is weak.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature
    of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works
    out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
    so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
    opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called
    a heaven-born captain.

34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
    are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make
    way for each other in turn.  There are short days and long;
    the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

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Chapter VII. MANEUVERING


 1. Sun Tzu said:  In war, the general receives his
    commands from the sovereign.

 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
    he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof
    before pitching his camp.

 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering,
    than which there is nothing more difficult. 
    The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists
    in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route,
    after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting
    after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him,
    shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.

 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
    with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order
    to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
    too late.  On the other hand, to detach a flying column
    for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
    and stores.

 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their
    buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day
    or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
    doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage,
    the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into
    the hands of the enemy.

 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded
    ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth
    of your army will reach its destination.

 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver
    the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
    and only half your force will reach the goal.

10. If you march thirty LI with the same object,
    two-thirds of your army will arrive.

11. We may take it then that an army without its
    baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
    without bases of supply it is lost.

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are
    acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march
    unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
    mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices,
    its marshes and swamps.

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage
    to account unless we make use of local guides.

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
    must be decided by circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
    your compactness that of the forest.

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,
    is immovability like a mountain.

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
    and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
    divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
    cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice
    of deviation.  Such is the art of maneuvering.

23. The Book of Army Management says:  On the field
    of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: 
    hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can ordinary
    objects be seen clearly enough:  hence the institution
    of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
    whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused
    on one particular point.

25. The host thus forming a single united body,
    is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
    or for the cowardly to retreat alone.  This is the art
    of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires
    and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners,
    as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
    a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;
    by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
    his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when
    its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish
    and inclined to return.  This is the art of studying moods.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance
    of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art
    of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still
    far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is
    toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy
    is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose
    banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking
    an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this
    is the art of studying circumstances.

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill
    against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight;
    do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. 
    Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. 
    Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

37. Such is the art of warfare.

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40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this
    may be termed the business of the general.

41. The different measures suited to the nine
    varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or
    defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: 
    these are things that must most certainly be studied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general
    principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion;
    penetrating but a short way means dispersion.

43. When you leave your own country behind, and take
    your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself
    on critical ground.  When there are means of communication
    on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.

44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is
    serious ground.  When you penetrate but a little way,
    it is facile ground.

45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear,
    and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. 
    When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire
    my men with unity of purpose.  On facile ground, I would
    see that there is close connection between all parts
    of my army.

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye
    on my defenses.  On ground of intersecting highways,
    I would consolidate my alliances.

49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure
    a continuous stream of supplies.  On difficult ground,
    I would keep pushing on along the road.

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way
    of retreat.  On desperate ground, I would proclaim
    to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.

51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer
    an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard
    when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he
    has fallen into danger.

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring
    princes until we are acquainted with their designs.  We are
    not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar
    with the face of the country--its mountains and forests,
    its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. 
    We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
    unless we make use of local guides.

53. To be ignored of any one of the following four
    or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.

54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,
    his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration
    of the enemy's forces.  He overawes his opponents,
    and their allies are prevented from joining against him.

55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all
    and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. 
    He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his
    antagonists in awe.  Thus he is able to capture their
    cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
    issue orders without regard to previous arrangements;
    and you will be able to handle a whole army as though
    you had to do with but a single man.

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself;
    never let them know your design.  When the outlook is bright,
    bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when
    the situation is gloomy.

58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;
    plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off
    in safety.

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into
    harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully
    accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall
    succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing
    by sheer cunning.

63. On the day that you take up your command,
    block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
    and stop the passage of all emissaries.

64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you
    may control the situation.

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
    and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate
    yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,
    until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate
    the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late
    for the enemy to oppose you.

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