Will Bernanke Create Hyperinflation?
Axel Merk
Merk Hard Currency
Fund
December 16, 2005
What are the lessons from the
Great Depression, from stagflation in the 1970s, from deflation
in Japan? The bubbles that preceded these challenging times should
never have been allowed to happen. Yet even today, the Federal
Reserve Bank (Fed) is very reluctant to pop bubbles. Greenspan
talked about irrational exuberance in the stock markets, but
let the stock market rise to the stratosphere in the late '90s;
he has also kept interest rates low for an extended period despite
mounting consumer debt and steep home price appreciation.
Central banks allow excessive
credit expansion to take place. Partially this may be because
central bankers do not recognize a bubble until they are reasonably
well developed. Partially this may be out of fear of political
repercussions if central bankers were to openly target perceived
bubbles in their infancy. To a great extent it is also because
some central bankers believe they can mitigate the fallout from
the bursting of a bubble.
Richard Koo, author of 'The
Balance Sheet Recession', says massive government spending must
take the place of corporate spending to keep an economy afloat
when corporations do not invest and consumers do not spend. Koo
considers himself to be a leading voice for the 'Japanese experiment'.
He argues that corporations that come out of a bubble with massive
debt are more interested in repairing their balance sheets, i.e.
pay down debt, than to invest. He rejects the notion that such
companies should be allowed to fail when the problem is systemic
such that 95% of banks have a negative net worth and there would
not be any buyers in the ensuing shakeout. Consequently, the
economy would potentially suffer a meltdown. He has supported
the use of public funds to keep the Japanese economy afloat and
has encouraged a gradual and cautious disposal of non-performing
loans (NPLs) for banks. Theoretically, government spending should
be curtailed once the economy is self-sustaining again. We are
skeptical that this will succeed, as once the government has
authorized spending projects, they take on a life of their own.
As a result, we are growing increasingly concerned about the
yen as the Japanese economy shows signs of strength.
Policy makers have a choice
to bring an economy to its knees to eradicate any excess; or
to provide the appropriate stimulus to try to neutralize just
about any potential crisis. Ben Bernanke during his confirmation
hearing to succeed Greenspan as head of the Fed, emphasized the
experience of the Fed governors will help to preserve prosperity.
It goes without saying that inducing a depression by choice is
something few central bankers are willing to make. When a central
bank takes a more active role in promoting structural change
before a bubble has evolved, such as the European Central Bank
(ECB) has done over the past couple of years, critics are abundant.
Europe experienced hyperinflation twice in the 20th century and
is more concerned about the fallout of excess credit than, for
example, the Fed or the Bank of Japan.
Bernanke says that "to
understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macro-economics."
Fed policy makers have also been observing the Japanese experiment
very closely. During his nomination hearing to succeed Fed chairman
Greenspan, Bernanke praised the depth of experience of the Fed
governors. He also said he saw the role of the Fed to provide
adequate liquidity during a financial crisis. All of this suggests
that when we face a crisis, the Fed under Bernanke's leadership
will seek to rectify any imbalance with a stimulus.
We believe there is substantial
risk that central bankers will not fully appreciate that the
upcoming economic slowdown we foresee is very different in nature.
Both in the 1930s in the US and in the 1990s in Japan, the corporate
sector was in turmoil. This time around, with some notable exceptions
(think automotive sector), corporate America is in reasonable
shape. It is the consumer sector that we are most concerned about.
There may also be significant fallout to the financial sector
should there be a collapse in housing prices. The Fed has to
be careful how it applies its stimulus. The traditional stimulus
will encourage corporations to invest more. The problem is that
corporations are likely to be encouraged to invest overseas in
search of greater returns as their traditional customers, the
American consumer, is exhausted. Any stimulus will further increase
pressures in producer prices as raw material prices are likely
to stay elevated. Given the cheap imports from Asia and high
consumer debt, pricing power is likely to remain disappointing.
As a result, real wage growth is likely to be lackluster at best
as corporations must minimize labor cost to remain competitive.
This year, car manufacturers
gave "employee discounts" to empty their lots. Right
after Thanksgiving, substantial discounts were given to shoppers
to lure them out to the stores. As top line growth may be attained,
few retailers are likely to be satisfied with their margins.
A slowdown in the housing market and high winter heating cost
will put further pressure on consumer spending. An already negative
savings rate cannot continue forever. As consumers realize that
their real wages do not grow, that they cannot rely on extracting
equity out of their homes, that competition from Asia may be
a threat to their standard of living, the rational reaction will
be to spend less. Given the dependence on the world economy on
consumer spending, we believe the Fed will interpret the economic
data as a warning sign that deflation could set in and a recession
or even depression could follow unless the economy is 'saved'
before a deflationary spiral is initiated.
So far, inflation has been
tame because of Asia's willingness to flood the US markets with
cheap goods, subsidized by rigid exchange rates. However, inflation
is creeping through the production chain, and it is only a matter
of time that it will become more widely spread. Already, we see
significant inflation on any goods or services that cannot be
imported from Asia (most of us can relate to inflation in the
cost of healthcare and education). As the US economy slows,
foreigners may be less inclined to acquire US assets, vital to
support the dollar given a current account deficit around 6%
of Gross Domestic Product.
What if the
Fed applies the perceived lesson from the Great Depression and
the Japanese experiment to prop up the American consumer? If
Japan is any guide, rather than allowing financial distress to
happen amongst households (in Japan it was corporations), policies
are likely to be put in place to allow households to make ends
meet. But if the consumer knows that the government will come
to their rescue, consumers may not have a good incentive to start
saving. Whereas it used to be a virtue to leave something for
your heirs, the baby boomer generation is likely to make it a
virtue to squeeze the last cent out of a reverse mortgage to
finance retirement (a reverse mortgage provides a steady income
stream from a bank in return for incremental increases in a mortgage)
Inflation cannot be switched
off like a light switch. We are concerned that by the time the
Fed realizes that preserving the consumer's financial health
may be a losing battle, inflationary pressures will no longer
be containable. Any effect on the US economy will be amplified
should the dollar fall sharply under the weight of the current
account deficit.
December 15, 2005
Axel Merk
Contact
Merk
©2005-2012 Merk Investments
LLC. All Rights Reserved.
The views in
this article were those of Axel Merk as of the article's publication
date and may not reflect his views at any time thereafter. These
views and opinions should not be construed as investment advice
nor considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer
to buy shares of any securities mentioned herein. Mr. Merk is
the founder and president of Merk Investments LLC and is
the portfolio manager for the Merk Hard and Asian Currency Funds.
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