Currency values and interest
rates:
Carried away by the carry trade
Steven Lachance
March 7, 2006
Currency traders have an infatuation
with interest rate differentials. Under the prevailing assumption,
currencies issued by countries with high interest rates ought
to appreciate against currencies issued by countries with low
interest rates. This follows the logic of the carry trade, where
the currency procured at low rates is exchanged for the currency
deployed at high rates. While this temporarily stimulates demand
for the high rate currency, it creates an open short position
that only accentuates the fundamentally superior value of the
low rate currency. This value rests on the axiom that interest
rates and credit risk are inversely related. The market assigns
rates in line with this axiom, granting the lowest rate to the
debt denominated in the most creditworthy currency. Trading against
this axiom amounts to trading against the secular trend and runs
the risk of being caught flatfooted by sudden realignments of
currency value and credit risk.
The carry trade has developed
largely because real interest rate differentials are determined
on false grounds. The nominal interest rate differential between
Japan and the US, for example, is 450bps based on their respective
overnight lending rates (zero for Japan vs. 4.5% for the US).
The real interest rate differential is 250bps in favor of the
US when derived by subtracting government estimated CPI rates
(0.5% for Japan vs. 2.5% for the US). Borrowing in Japan to lend
in the US appears rational and profitable.
CPI rates, however, are not
an effective proxy for inflation, which is the rate at which
the total supply of money and credit in an economy is growing.
By this measure, real interest rates are negative in both countries:
minus 1.5% in Japan (zero interest less 1.5% inflation) and minus
4.0% in the US (4.5% less 8.5% inflation). The real interest
rate differential is 250bps in favor of Japan. The spread widens
to 400bps in favor of Japan based on the interest rates of their
respective 10-year notes (1.6% for Japan vs. 4.6% for the US).
Borrowing in Japan to lend in the US, therefore, is actually
irrational and highly unlikely to be profitable when positions
are closed.
The real interest rate differential
between Japan and the US based on money and credit growth, the
proper definition of inflation, is consistent with the order
of nominal interest rates assigned by the debt market, which
also favors Japan. Interest rates on Japanese debt are lower
than interest rates on American debt; rates for Swiss and Eurozone
debt lie in between. There is only one currency that can be borrowed
at an interest rate lower than the yen: gold, whose rate of interest,
euphemistically called the leasing rate, is only marginally above
zero along the entire rate curve. This interest rate order is
also congruent with rates of appreciation against the dollar
since currency exchange rates were floated in 1971, with gold
rising the most followed by the yen.
The large buildup of an open
short position adds to the yen's appeal as the currency with
the lowest nominal interest rate among irredeemable fiat monies
and Japan's status as the world's largest creditor state. The
eventual covering of this position will temporarily exaggerate
the yen's appreciation against the dollar, with the trigger as
likely to be a change in risk premiums demanded on US debt as
a narrowing of the nominal interest rate differential between
the two countries. Risk premiums fluctuate according to perceived
credit risk. If investors become concerned over the creditworthiness
of US debt issuers, they will demand higher rates, pushing down
bond values. The borrowed yen has been used to buy US bonds,
and a significant loss of their market value would induce owners
to sell and repay outstanding yen loans. Consequently, a devaluation
of the dollar against the yen could, in fact, occur in tandem
with a widening of the nominal interest rate differential between
Japan and the US. Currency traders gawking exclusively at rate
spreads wouldn't even see what hit them.
Steven Lachance
Tokyo, Japan
email: lachance@mail2world.com
Steven Lachance is a financial
translator based in Tokyo. Over the last decade, he has worked
for major European and Japanese investment banks, including Deutsche
Bank Group, Commerzbank, Nikko Solomon Smith Barney, and Mizuho
Securities.
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