CHARTWORKS - JULY 13, 2005
Peak Credit?
Bob Hoye
Institutional Advisors
posted Jul 14, 2005
ChartWorks PUBLISHED BY INSTITUTIONAL ADVISORS
Credit forces trump great speculative
visions - every time.
"Measured by the increase
in asset values over the past five years, the global housing
boom is the biggest financial bubble in history. The bigger the
boom, the bigger the bust."
-The Economist, Week of June 23
"Even if risks are being
appropriately priced given the current outlook, financial market
participants have taken on relatively illiquid assets to enhance
yield, possibly giving rise to difficulties in adjusting balance
sheets."
-Bank of England, Week of June 23
The last sentences in the above
statements from distinguished sources should be compelling but,
after a brief break, speculative convictions in commodities continue.
No matter whether the speculation
has been in tangible assets, as in 1980 or 1988 or, for that
matter, in 1920, one key to the contraction has been the spike
and reversal in commodity prices. Much the same holds when the
mania has been in financial assets, as in the fateful blowouts
of 2000, 1929, and 1873 - to mention only 3 of the 6 great financial
bubbles.
We have been describing this
boom as the one that typically arises out of the collapse of
a tech mania. With strong commodities, we have also been describing
this as an "old fashioned" business cycle. More lately,
we have been noting that the crowd has been again showing considerable
compulsion to be long the big visions.
However, our mission has been,
as best as is possible, to anticipate major trend reversals.
Although this phase of speculation has encompassed both financial
and tangible assets, the alerts to the reversal will be the old
standards of credit spreads widening ( since March), commodities
topping ( ditto), and the yield curve reversing to steepening
(not yet, but soon).
Too much of the financial world
remains convinced that the Chinese expansion is unassailable
and the Fed's compulsion to depreciate the dollar is not to be
denied. However, Mr. Market and Mother Nature are about to reverse
most, if not all, of the games.
Fortunately, this will likely
be done in the typical manner that, beyond the stalling out of
commodities, will include a profound change in the credit markets.
There has been a wall of worry
about massive shortages of base metals, metallurgical coal, and
crude oil.
One recent example sums it
up: "World Reserves of Cheap Oil Have Probably Peaked."
This prompts a line for the
way Mr. Market and Ms. Nature will deny the mania in commodities:
"World Reserves of Cheap Credit Have Probably Peaked."
The end of great manias involves
a mighty struggle of speculative passions. These include the
compulsion of the "big story", those who have been
prematurely shorting it and, above all, those who have been providing
the credit. The latter always includes the "easy money"
compulsion of borrowing short and lending long, which drives
the yield curve towards inversion.
Since the advent of the modern
senior central bank with the Bank of England in 1694, the ability
of market forces to expand and then contract credit have eventually
and always overwhelmed the attempts of policymakers to continuously
expand credit. All that is needed is to have the mania encompass
all of the available credit and then the mystery of the end of
a bubble develops.
It is essential to fully grasp
that it has not been "liquidity" that has been driving
prices up - quite the opposite - as soaring prices permit and
foster the expansion of credit. This is what someone with perspective
at the Bank of England is concerned about in the quotation above.
In looking at U.S. corporate
spreads, there has been a significant reversal to widening in
March. Using the "high-yield", over treasuries, going
through 350 bps would extend the widening trend (330 bps this
week; the "low" was 183 bps). This would be one typical
warning on the demise of this phase of a great asset inflation.
Another step would be the reversal
in the U.S. treasury curve from flattening to steepening. In
reviewing the data since 1858, it is not essential that the curve
fully invert to signal a contraction. All it needs is to reverse
to steepening within the context of a market mania.
The U.S. curve is rather flat
and the U.K. curve, which inverted from early March to early
June, has set a modest steepening trend.
The CRB, in its original form,
has virtually (in timing and percent gain) replicated the bull
market that blew out in 1980. It will be interesting to see if
the increased weighting in crude oil maintains the replication.
However, this is academic and
it is important to recognize the signposts of speculation and
these are reasonably typical - whether the action is on stocks,
bonds, commodities, or real estate. The details of weighting
of one commodity index is not all that material.
Moreover, the characteristics
of speculation are fungible and can be seen in whatever the asset
play is and in whatever century it occurs.
The warnings from change in
the credit markets are typical and are mounting, in which case
all that is needed is to have prices in the speculative games
weaken as credit spreads extend their widening trend and the
U.S. treasury curve reverses to steepening. At that stage, Mr.
Margin joins forces with Mr. Market and Ms. Nature.
The conclusions in the above
quotation from The Economist are appropriate, but it's worth
adding that, as seen in 1Q 2000, as long as the uptrend is intact
the street will believe the most preposterous stories.
It is possible that this could
be more widely understood by October.
Bob Hoye
Institutional Advisors
E-mail bobhoye@institutionaladvisors.com
Website: www.institutionaladvisors.com
CHARTWORKS - JULY 13, 2005
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