Silver
Futures CoT
Adam Hamilton
Archives
Sep 9, 2005
While September marks the dawn
of the seasonally strong time of year for silver, the white metal
hasn't fared well lately. It has spent the last six months or
so largely grinding sideways, yielding no traction for bulls
or bears.
This episode has been particularly
trying for investors deployed in silver to ride the ongoing commodities bull.
Silver is unique among commodities and has extraordinary potential.
It is a relatively small market largely supplied by byproduct
silver from base-metal mining. Regardless of how high silver
prices run, base-metal miners are not able to ramp up their silver
production rapidly.
This inelastic supply is coupled
with even more inelastic industrial demand. Silver's unique
physical properties make it essential for many manufactured products.
But since these products use such tiny quantities of silver
per unit, its price can rise without significantly retarding
industrial demand. And pure speculative demand stacks on top
of this, no other major commodity rockets as fast as silver when
speculators start lusting after it.
Thus, silver should be thriving
in our commodities bull. In recent weeks I have been pondering
silver's disappointing performance of late and even wrote about
it in depth in the new September issue of our Zeal Intelligence
monthly newsletter. As I researched silver, one troubling theme
kept recurring.
A growing number of investors
are becoming convinced that games are being played in the silver
futures market to either retard its advance or cap it outright.
Since I have clients asking me about these theses with increasing
regularity, this week I would like to take a look at the raw
silver futures data directly from the US Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and see if anything odd emerges.
The raw data analyzed below
was obtained from the CFTC's famous Commitments of Traders reports
that it publishes weekly. These CoTs are data-rich and offer
all kinds of valuable information on long and short positions
that traders are taking in commodities futures. Charted over
time, the CoT numbers help illuminate long-term futures trading
trends that can affect commodities prices.
Before delving into the underlying
futures data though, it is very important to understand some
baseline facts on futures. Investors who attempt to analyze
futures data without bearing these truths in mind run the risk
of seriously misinterpreting the data and running into trouble.
Futures can either be bought
first then sold later or sold first and then bought back later.
Traders buying futures now with the intent to sell later are
longs, they benefit when the underlying commodity price rises.
Taking the other side of the longs' trades are the shorts.
They sell futures now and then buy them back later to cover their
positions. They benefit when the underlying commodity price
falls.
Every single futures contract
has both a long and a short side, two traders taking the opposite
sides of one trade. Thus, the total number of longs and shorts
in any futures market, including silver, is always in perfect
parity. Longs can never exceed shorts or vice versa. This is
really important because any silver futures manipulation theses
must acknowledge the fact that every silver short in existence
is perfectly offset by a long, always.
The total number of silver
futures contracts outstanding at any time is known as open interest.
In order for open interest to grow as more traders participate
in the silver futures market, new longs and shorts added must
be equal. Since futures are a zero-sum game, meaning one trader's
win is another trader's direct loss, it is impossible for new
shorts to be added without offsetting new longs.
So if anyone attempted to manipulate
silver prices via tactical silver futures trading, they cannot
do it by growing shorts alone. Every short contract must have
a long out there who wants to buy it. At least two offsetting
traders directly competing against each other are necessary to
grow open interest. Shorts cannot play this game alone in isolation.
It takes two to tango in futures!
The actual open interest in
silver futures has grown nicely in this silver bull to date,
it has doubled. Each contract outstanding at any given time
represents two independent traders, one on the long side of the
contract and another offsetting on the short side. This chart
showing rising silver OI is absolutely typical of futures behavior
in any commodities bull market.
One of the core axioms of the
markets is that nothing begets buying interest like higher prices.
Whether it was NASDAQ in 1999, real estate today, or commodities
tomorrow, the higher the prices of a particular asset class rise
the more investors and speculators become interested in riding
the bull trend. Thus it is totally natural and expected for
futures open interest to rise continually as long as its underlying
bull market persists.
Earlier this year I did some
similar research in gold
futures and the exact same bull-market OI signature showed
up. The garden-variety normalcy of continuously growing OI during
secular bull markets is crucial for investors to understand.
The reason is some analysts advance theories stating that an
old OI high being reached means it is time to sell. This is
not often true in an ongoing bull market.
In this chart above, for example,
note the OI spike to 110k silver futures contracts outstanding
in mid-2003. Some folks believed that this new bull-to-date
OI high established a new horizontal resistance zone that silver
would not be able to overcome, so next time OI ran near 110k
they advocated selling. Yet, in late 2003 silver once again
hit 110k OI and then promptly rocketed higher in its largest
bull-to-date upleg! And a fresh new OI high above 120k was soon
established.
It is natural for open interest
in any market to grow as long as rising prices are attracting
in new traders, as long as bull markets persist. Investors should
expect existing bull-to-date OI highs to give way to new higher
OI highs as the bull marches on. Establishing horizontal resistance
zones based on previous bull-to-date OI highs is not prudent
and usually leads to poor trading decisions.
In reality, OI runs in an upward-sloping
trend pipe in a bull market. The rising support and resistance
lines currently binding silver's OI are drawn in red above.
Interestingly, the position of silver's OI in its uptrend can
even be used as a trading signal.
When silver OI is near its
lower support line, it tends to be a great time to buy for another
run higher. This is readily apparent in this chart if you carefully
examine each OI support intercept relative to the behavior of
the silver price in the months following. Low OI is a useful
buy signal because it only happens when silver speculators are
bored because prices have been low for awhile. When prices are
languishing capital migrates elsewhere reducing silver OI but
it is at these very sentiment lows where the seeds of new rallies
are sown.
Conversely silver OI trading
near its upper resistance line generally marks great times to
sell silver or at least be neutral. While not always the case,
high OI often occurs as traders are growing too enthusiastic
about silver over the short term and an interim top is being
carved. The contrarian play to make at these times is to fade
the short-term euphoria and wait for OI to once again drop as
prices decay in one of their periodic bull-market corrections.
Since silver's OI uptrend looks
completely normal within the context of this bull, any silver
manipulation theses must look elsewhere for evidence. While
total longs and shorts outstanding are always perfectly equal,
there are actually three different classes of futures traders
delineated by the Commitments of Traders report from the CFTC.
They are commercial hedgers, non-commercial large speculators,
and non-reportable small speculators.
Hedgers are directly involved
in the silver markets in some way. They use the futures markets
to offload their price risk to speculators. Silver miners use
futures contracts to lock in their silver selling price now for
silver delivered later to ensure their business cashflows are
predictable and adequate. Silver industrial users, also hedgers,
use futures to lock in their buying price today for silver they
will need later for their products.
Truly the only reason futures
markets exist is so hedgers buying and selling commodities can
offload the risk of price fluctuations to willing speculators.
These speculators crave this price risk as they are betting
on earning financial profits as silver prices rise and fall.
They very seldom if ever deal in the underlying physical silver,
it is just a pure paper game for them. The large speculators
must report their evolving long and short positions to the CFTC
on an ongoing basis.
The third class of futures
traders is much smaller than the first two, the small speculators.
Small speculators are often individual investors like you or
me betting on price fluctuations in silver. We generally have
no intention of taking delivery on a contract and we seek to
bear risk just like the large speculators. Since small specs
have tiny positions relative to the entire silver futures market,
they do not have to report to the CFTC. Their collective weekly
positions are inferred based on the positions of the hedgers
and large specs.
Within each of these three
classes various traders have long and short positions. If the
total longs are offset against the total shorts held by one class,
it shows a net position. For example, if small specs had 33k
long contracts and 13k short contracts, their net position would
be 20k long silver futures. In this case the majority of small
spec contracts are long so they generally believe the silver
price is going higher.
While the total number of longs
and shorts is always equal, the composition of net positions
shifts among the three trader classes. Charting these evolving
net positions over time offers interesting insights into the
psychology underlying each trader class.
Since open interest grows over
time in a bull market, it is natural that net long and net short
positions will grow as well. This chart is also garden-variety
typical for net futures distributions in an ongoing bull market.
Gold looks
the same way. The net positions in all three classes tend to
grow larger over time and form a giant horizontal wedge gradually
expanding to the right until the bull ends.
The biggest point of contention
on this chart is the growing net-short position of the hedgers,
rendered in yellow. Many silver manipulation theses swirl around
the perceived ability of these hedgers to cap or retard prices
by piling on their short positions. Adherents to these theses
fear silver prices are doomed to fall whenever hedger net shorts
approach existing bull-to-date extremes.
But if open interest rises
throughout this silver bull, and new longs and shorts are always
equal, then it is inevitable that silver shorts will rise. They
don't seem to seriously retard this bull though. Silver went
from close to $4 to over $8 so far and hedger net shorts grew
on balance the entire time. I know it seems counterintuitive,
but the higher the silver price goes driving increased open interest,
the more short positions the hedgers will pile on.
The key to understanding this
behavior lies in the very word hedgers. Silver hedgers are involved
in the physical silver industry in some way, such as miners.
Mining is a very risky business and all kinds of things can
go wrong. It is also very capital-intensive so miners cannot
afford to have insufficient cashflows because their silver comes
to market during one of the periodic silver pullbacks. Thus,
silver miners sell futures today to lock in their selling prices
tomorrow. They then deliver into these contracts to settle them
as their silver production allows.
Now as an investor I loathe
producer
hedging. It not only protects silver miners from silver's
downside in a correction, but it sells off silver's upside to
speculators. Thus a hedged silver miner will not be able to
fully reap the massive profits leverage to silver during one
of the metal's bull-market uplegs. Investors don't want to own
hedged silver miners during a secular bull market since they
have sold away some of their upside profits gains.
But as an analyst, I do understand
why hedgers lock in tomorrow's prices today. And if you examine
the chart above carefully, they even do it fairly logically.
Hedger net shorts are usually the greatest when silver is making
a major interim high. Thus the hedgers, through selling futures
today that they will deliver into to offset tomorrow, are doing
a reasonably good job of selling at relatively high prices rather
than low prices.
Just as hedgers having net-short
positions are merely a normal part of a bull-market futures economy,
so are speculators offsetting these hedgers with net longs.
Total speculator longs also rise throughout a bull market as
more speculators get interested and start chasing the gains.
Looking at the behavior of large specs and small specs over
time is quite interesting.
Large speculators, often hedge
funds, should be the most astute traders in the market. They
have lots of capital and experience to match it so they should
be the elite leaders that small specs want to follow. Provocatively
though, as a group these large specs tend to trade like mainstream
momentum investors and not contrarians. They tend to be the
most heavily long near major interim tops and the least long
near major interim bottoms, the exact wrong times!
Obviously the best time to
be heavily long is just after silver has corrected and the time
to pare back longs is when silver is getting overbought to new
interim highs. While there are certainly individual large specs
who are elite contrarian traders who understand this well, as
a herd they act pretty conventionally. When hedgers want to
sell contracts near major interim tops to lock in their selling
prices, it is the large specs that are providing most of the
offsetting long trades.
Another silver fallacy, though
not manipulation related, concerns small speculators. I can't
tell you how many times I have heard, from mainstream stock-market
investors, that there is an unsustainable mania in silver. Because
silver investors talk about silver over the Internet, there is
a perception that we have already bid it as high as it can go.
But as the actual CoT data on small spec net longs charted above
shows, small specs aren't even remotely excited about silver
yet.
Since mid-2002, when silver
traded near $5, the small spec net-long position has essentially
been flatlined. For the past three years there is no evidence
that small speculators are growing too enthusiastic about silver
yet. Indeed, they actually seem bored and indifferent since
their net-long exposure hasn't been rising even with an excellent
uptrend in silver over the past couple of years. When a true
mania arrives someday, small spec net longs will almost certainly
skyrocket.
Well, if the silver futures
open interest and CoT distribution among the three classes looks
perfectly normal, that leaves one more avenue of potential silver
capping via futures. It involves concentration ratios, and unlike
the OI and CoT data discussed above I cannot dismiss this thesis
outright. But thankfully, as you will see, the potential for
short-term manipulation via concentration domination is steadily
falling as open interest rises.
Concentration ratios reveal
the percentage of open interest held by the largest traders in
silver futures. These largest traders can be either hedgers
or large speculators since these two groups are not broken out
when it comes to computing concentration ratios. For this analysis
I used net concentration ratios, or the concentration ratios
after a given large trader's longs and shorts are offset. For
example if one particular trader has 100 silver longs and 50
silver shorts, he is considered a net-long trader with 50 contracts.
To understand concentration
ratios, we must first discuss how prices move in futures markets.
In order for the silver futures
price to move, there must be a temporary supply and demand imbalance
in silver futures. If someone wants to buy 10 silver futures
contracts but only 3 are offered for sale at the prevailing price,
then the market maker must raise the silver price until 7 more
contracts are offered for sale. Once the price gets high enough
so the order for 10 longs is matched by 10 shorts, the transaction
takes place.
As long as silver futures supply
and demand matches perfectly in time, the silver price will not
move regardless of volume. If I want to sell 100 contracts of
silver at the same moment you want to buy 100, the brokers will
facilitate this transaction instantly without any price movements.
The same applies even if 10k contracts are bought and sold at
the same time by different parties, no price movements.
But what happens if a seller
wants to sell 10k contracts immediately but all the buyers together
only want 1k at the moment? The market maker faces a supply/demand
imbalance. He has to start lowering the silver price until the
buyers think the deal is good enough to want to buy 10k contracts
in aggregate instead of their 1k at the original higher price.
When the price falls low enough so futures demand meets the
supply, the transaction will take place.
Since the futures price of
silver is totally a function of the timing and size of buy and
sell orders, large traders can temporarily manipulate prices
if they have enough capital. If a single trader puts in a 10k
sell order of silver futures, knowing that there won't be buyers
who want 10k longs, it knows the price of silver will fall until
enough buying interest materializes to absorb its full sell order.
This is the most logical way for short-term silver manipulation
to happen in the futures market.
The best available measure
for the potential of large traders to dominate the smaller traders
on the other side of their trades is the concentration ratio.
It shows the percentage of open interest that the 4 and 8 largest
reportable traders on the long and short sides control at any
given time. The higher the concentration ratio on the short
side, the higher the probability that large short sales won't
be immediately absorbed by smaller and fragmented long traders
without a temporary price drop.
Our final chart this week shows
the net concentration ratios on both the long and short sides
by the 4 and 8 largest silver futures traders over time. It
offers all kinds of interesting insights both potentially supporting
and opposing silver manipulation theses focusing on capital dominance
by one side of the trade.
It is important to note that
net concentration ratios in silver futures are universally falling
as this bull market marches on. As more traders are attracted
to the vast opportunities in silver, open interest rises. With
more participants the amount of capital that it takes for the
large traders to maintain high concentration ratios grows dramatically.
The more traders involved in a market, the more the relative
power of existing traders is diluted.
This being acknowledged, the
shorts are still far more concentrated than the longs for this
entire concentration downtrend. Back in mid-2002 the largest
8 traders with net-short positions controlled over 70% of the
open interest compared to around 50% for the largest 8 net-long
traders. Today the largest 8 net-short traders' influence has
been cut in half to around 38%. But the 8 largest net longs
have fallen even more, to 21%.
Thus today's net-short concentration
is approaching twice that of net-long concentration among the
largest silver traders. There are far fewer short traders than
long traders and they are less fragmented, so it is much easier
for one or more of them to place large sell orders than it is
for the less-capitalized longs to group together and hit the
markets with large buy orders. So the potential for short-term
price manipulations via large sell orders that cannot be easily
matched by longs certainly exists.
So is this lack of parity between
long and short concentration odd? Does it threaten the ongoing
silver bull?
I don't think a higher net-short
concentration is odd at all. If you recall from the second chart
above, the hedgers are the largest players on the net-short side
during a bull market. There really aren't a lot of these hedgers,
including mining companies, so they control a lot more capital
than an average large or small speculator. If the number of
hedgers is considerably less than the number of large specs and
vastly less than the number of small specs, then it is only natural
that the hedgers will have higher concentration ratios.
And since hedgers want to lock
in selling prices for their future production, their primary
focus in futures trading is selling silver futures to guarantee
their own future selling prices. As hedgers are the smallest
class in terms of the raw number of traders and the short side
is their primary trade in a bull, it is only natural that net-short
concentration ratios will be higher than the net longs.
And even if one or more large
traders were trying to suppress the silver price, the very nature
of the futures markets makes this a self-defeating proposition.
Every contract a silver short sells has to be purchased by a
long. So if long demand isn't out there, a silver short is limited
in the amount of contracts it can sell. No silver trader, no
matter how well capitalized, can sell unlimited contracts short
since demand is finite.
In addition, a silver short
who cannot deliver the physical metal eventually has to buy back
its shorts to close the contracts. If a silver short dumps a
large block of silver futures in the markets to temporarily drive
down prices, sometime in the coming months it will create demand
when it buys back these contracts that will drive prices back
up. Even if these offsetting long purchases are spread over
time unlike the one-time selling dump, the aggregate effect of
long purchases will drive silver prices higher.
While higher net-short concentration
ratios reveal the possibility of short-term attempts to hit the
silver price, over the long term such attempts won't work in
a zero-sum game like futures. Shorts have to be purchased by
longs immediately and then to close these shorts in the future
longs must be purchased driving up prices. In addition, over
time the silver concentration ratios are falling indicating that
the relative power the large traders wield is fading with wider
silver participation.
In light of this totally normal
silver futures CoT data, I don't think silver futures manipulation
was the most likely cause of silver's malaise of late. I do
have an alternative thesis that I explained in depth in the new
September issue of our acclaimed Zeal
Intelligence monthly newsletter for our subscribers.
In this letter I also outlined some elite silver stocks that
are likely to thrive when silver's bull market reasserts itself,
probably in the coming months.
The bottom line is the bull-to-date
silver futures CoT data looks normal for a commodities bull.
Open interest is growing as silver prices rise. Hedgers are
doing more hedging as the silver prices rise as well, locking
in their silver prices for business reasons. This is all perfectly
ordinary behavior and nothing unexpected.
The highest potential area
for short-term price suppression exists in the concentration
ratios, which the shorts still dominate. But even if this is
happening, which is somewhat doubtful due to the way the futures
markets work, the increasing open interest is slowly and steadily
eroding the relative power of the largest traders in the markets.
This will make large orders from them less effective at bullying
prices temporarily than in recent years.
Silver, like all markets, will
ultimately move on its own core underlying physical supply and
demand fundamentals, not mere paper buying and selling in the
futures markets. And these physical fundamentals remain dazzlingly
bullish for silver.
Adam Hamilton, CPA
September 9, 2005
Thoughts, comments, or flames? Fire away at zelotes@zealllc.com. Due to my staggering and perpetually increasing e-mail load, I regret that I am not able to respond to comments personally. I will read all messages though and really appreciate your feedback!
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