Curse of the Trading Range 3
Adam Hamilton
Archives
May 26, 2006
Propelled by the recent massive
spikes in the metals as well as the persistently strong energy
prices, the 2006 markets have been very much dominated by commodities.
Contrarian investors and speculators have naturally gravitated
towards these hot commodities markets to ride the early second
stage of this global raw-materials boom.
While we are being blessed
with huge profits in elite commodities stocks, the progress of
the general stock markets never ventures too far from the contrarian
mind. Back in the early 2000s before this great commodities bull
launched, many of the same speculators trading commodities stocks
today were short
the general stock markets. I am part of this crowd too and think
it is always important to keep an eye on stocks.
And from a contrarian perspective,
May has been one of the most interesting general-stock episodes
of the past several years. After powering higher relentlessly
since October, by May 10th the mighty Dow 30 had come within
striking distance of achieving a new all-time nominal high. In
January 2000 the Dow had closed at 11723, so it is not surprising
the bulls were really excited a couple weeks ago to see an 11643
close.
But before old record levels
could be exceeded, the Dow 30 started falling rather rapidly,
down 4.7% in just 9 trading days. With the Dow's market capitalization
near $3.8t, such a fast decline is not a trivial event since
it erases around $180b of equity. While such sharp pullbacks
are not particularly rare, I can quickly count about 8 more of
them on the Dow chart in the last several years, they do tend
to spawn widespread reflection.
The US stock markets have been
generally either powering or grinding higher since March 2003,
when the war rally launched the day Washington started bombing
Baghdad. What was initially a sharp relief surge has blossomed
into a full-blown cyclical bull market since. While very profitable
for those who have been long, the recent sharp decline is causing
growing concerns about what is likely to come next.
Since investors are far more
likely to consider controversial market theses after a fast decline
shakes their confidence, I'd like to revisit the contrarian view
of the US stock markets. Even though the Dow 30 is up a very
impressive 55% since March 2003, like most contrarian students
of market history I believe we are actually languishing in a
secular bear market today. Hogwash you say? Perhaps, but please
read on.
Stock markets move in great
cycles throughout history. Sometimes stocks are universally loved
as in early 2000 while at other times they are universally loathed
as in 1982. These cycles are extraordinarily important for long-term
stock investors to understand. They are most readily evident
when viewing the stock markets in valuation terms, how much investors
are paying for stocks relative to those stocks' underlying earnings
power.
When investors are discouraged
about stocks as they were in the early 1980s, stocks fall to
very low levels relative to the earnings they can spin off. The
general stock markets typically have a price-to-earnings ratio
near 7.0x at these major secular bottoms. Conversely when investors
grow euphoric about stocks as in the late 1990s, they can rapidly
bid up market P/Es above 28x earnings. This slowly oscillating
psychology dynamic creates the great cycles dominating market
history.
Never much for fancy academic
titles, I call these long valuation waves simply Long Valuation
Waves. An entire valuation wave generally runs for a third of
a century or so. So about every 33 to 34 years, stocks can move
from undervalued to overvalued and back again or vice versa.
Each one of these waves can be split in half too, yielding 17-year
great bull markets as we saw from 1982 to 2000 and their subsequent
17-year great bears.
Now if you are a stock investor
and you haven't yet studied Long Valuation Waves, you are putting
yourself at an almost insurmountable disadvantage relative to
someone who has. If this concept isn't familiar to you, I strongly
urge you to read an overview essay on this crucial topic I wrote
last August called "Long
Valuation Waves 2." Out of all my voluminous research
work, I believe this is easily the single most important
topic for investors to understand and internalize.
Like great ocean waves, valuation
waves run sequentially. After a valuation trough, like 1982,
the main valuation wave starts sweeping into shore over the next
17 years or so and ultimately drives stock prices to very high
levels relative to their earnings, the valuation crest like we
saw in early 2000. But after this valuation crest passes, the
valuation wave continues on and valuations relentlessly fall
for 17 years or so down its backface until the next valuation
trough. It is these receding valuation waves that create secular
bear markets.
If we are indeed in a receding
valuation wave, then stock investors are facing another decade
or so of declining valuations and flat-to-declining stock prices.
A decade! Since the average person's useful investing life is
probably only about 40 years from initial investments to retirement
and investment drawdown, the consequences of a long-term flat-to-declining
stock market are staggering. Investors with only a decade or
so left before retirement will not have a chance to recover from
another decade-long grind.
While the Long Valuation Waves
are indisputably
real, the important question today is determining where we
are currently likely at in these great third-of-a-century cycles.
Our two charts this week, updated from earlier
iterations of this line of research, make a crystal-clear
case of where we are right now in valuation wave terms. The first
compares the last two now legendary great bulls while the second
compares the market action since 2000 with the last brutal great
bear.
The latest great bull run from
1982 to 2000 is legendary and remains well known by the vast
majority of today's stock investors since they lived through
it. But only a few old timers and students of the markets remember
the nearly equally mighty great bull that preceded it, from 1949
to 1966. In this chart both axes are zeroed so the true magnitude
of each great bull is readily apparent and not distorted. These
great bulls were twins in many regards.
Over the course of each great
bull, Dow 30 P/E ratios and dividend yields are noted at key
technical points. In P/E ratio terms, 14x earnings is the average
historical fair value for stock markets. The reciprocal of 14x
earnings is a 7.1% earnings yield. 7% is a fair level for both
sides of a capital transaction. It is reasonable for savers to
earn 7% to lend the capital they haven't consumed and borrowers
to pay 7% to borrow the capital they haven't earned.
14x earnings is the long-term
average clearing price for capital transactions in the stock
markets. One half these fair-value levels, or 7x earnings, is
the general level witnessed during Long Valuation Wave troughs
when stocks are dirt cheap and likely to rise tremendously in
the coming 17 years. Twice fair-value levels, or 28x earnings
and higher, is the general level witnessed during Long Valuation
Wave crests when stocks are likely to languish in the coming
17 years.
The single most critical factor
for long-term investment success in the stock markets is not
which stocks you pick, but where the markets happen to be in
their latest Long Valuation Wave when you commit your capital.
If you buy at a valuation trough you won't have to do anything
because the valuation wave washing in will lift virtually all
stocks. But if you instead buy at a valuation crest, the same
buy-and-hold strategy will lead to no nominal gains and considerable
inflation-adjusted
losses. Valuation timing is everything for investment.
So where are we today in Long
Valuation Wave terms? I think the best way to discern this is
to view our last two great stock bulls superimposed. As you can
see above, stocks were cheap in both 1949 and 1982, the last
two major valuation wave troughs. In both cases valuations were
down near 7x earnings and dividend yields were high, over 6%.
Over the next 17 years in each case, stocks climbed relentlessly
on balance driving P/E ratios much higher and dividend yields
much lower.
By 1966 the Dow 30 was trading
at 24.1x earnings and only yielding 2.9% in dividends, the highest
valuations it had seen since the late summer of 1929. At the
time investors were euphoric though, believing they were traveling
in a brave New Era where valuation no longer mattered. The market
darling stocks at the time were the "Nifty 50", they
were giant American companies with consistent earnings growth
and high P/E ratios. This should sound familiar because the market
darling stocks in the late 1990s had very similar attributes.
But all great bulls must come
to an end, and without warning in early 1966 the Long Valuation
Wave crest was reached and the long 17-year journey began down
the other side of this wave to its trough. While the Dow fell
initially investors were not worried, just as they weren't in
the early 2000s, because they figured that "This Time It
Is Different". These are the five most dangerous words an
investor can ever utter and they have cost investors trillions
of dollars of capital in just the past half century alone.
While our next chart gets into
the resulting great bear starting after the 1966 valuation wave
crest, first carefully ponder the uncanny similarities between
the last two great bulls. By early 2000 the Dow 30 was trading
at 44.7x earnings and yielding just 1.0% in dividends, its highest
valuations by far in history. Even back in 1929 on the eve of
the Great Crash the general-stock-market valuation was "only"
running 32.6x. Our latest valuation crest drove the markets to
the highest valuation extremes they had seen in at least a century,
and probably ever.
While the 1960s great bull
was up roughly 10x, from around 100 to 1000 over 17 years, the
1990s great bull handily exceeded these gains. It was up about
15x in nominal terms from 1982 to 2000, a stupendous bull run
by any standards. As you ponder these statistical similarities,
carefully examine the chart above as well. In pure price-pattern
terms the last two great bulls had a great deal in common in
their ascents. In both cases investors increasingly poured capital
into stocks driving their valuations well above fair value to
overvalued levels.
Why is this comparison so important?
If we can establish, beyond any reasonable doubt, that 1982 to
2000 was a period when the Long Valuation Wave was coming in
and ultimately crested, then we are now in the subsequent period
where this same Long Valuation Wave is going back out and dragging
valuations back down into a trough. In the vernacular this part
of the valuation wave cycles is known as a secular bear, the
most dangerous time possible for long-term buy-and-hold investors.
And if the 1982 to 2000 great
bull matches up so well in valuation and price terms with the
1949 to 1966 great bull, isn't it at least prudent to consider
that perhaps this 2000 to 2017 period through which we now sojourn
will match up with the brutal 1966 to 1982 great bear? As a contrarian
and student of market history I obviously think the answer is
yes, but even if you disagree on a logical basis the following
chart ought to terrify you.
Great bear markets can unfold
in two ways, either via a wicked fast decline as from 1929 to
1932 or a long excruciating sideways trading range. The latter,
which I call the Curse of the Trading Range, is far more deadly
because it eliminates long-term investors' chances to win any
gains for the better part of two decades, nearly half their investing
lifespans. If you have 40 years to invest and lose 17, you may
as well just give up.
This chart overlays the market
action since the recent 2000 valuation wave crest with the great
bear that unfolded from 1966 to 1982. While the main chart does
not have zeroed axes, the inset chart on the lower right does
so you can view this troubling comparison without any axial distortion.
Love it or loathe it, the price action we have seen since 2000
is textbook Curse-of-the-Trading-Range stuff. Buy-and-hold stock
investors really need to carefully consider the obviously bearish
implications here.
The red line shows the Dow
30 during its last great bear. I've found that a lot of people
I've discussed this with, if they haven't studied market history,
believe that prices just fall in secular bear markets. This is
not necessarily true. In reality the last great bear was an immensely
volatile trading range that lasted for 17 years or so with zero
net gain from the 1966 top. There were unbelievably brutal declines
on the order of 45% and exhilarating rallies near 75%!
Such hyper-volatile conditions
are not a problem for speculators, who can buy the sentiment
bottoms and sell the sentiment tops, but for investors who like
orderly stock-price growth they can be psychologically devastating.
Investors who bought in 1966 when conditions looked awesome had
no capital gains yet in 1982, 17 years later!
And in reality, once adjusted
for inflation, they had a considerable real loss. My
studies on this 1966 to 1982 period in capital-gains terms
adjusted for inflation show investors lost an unbelievable two-thirds
of their purchasing power by buying and holding stocks, a 64%
real loss excluding any dividends they received. Talk about a
kick in the teeth!
This history is frightening
enough alone, but the current progress of the US stock markets
since 2000 has been mirroring that of the first 6 years or so
of the last great bear to a remarkable degree. Just as in the
last great bear, we have seen brutal downlegs like the one that
ended in late 2002 and awesome rallies, or cyclical bull markets,
like the one we've seen since early 2003. As this chart shows,
even on the zeroed-axis inset version, the magnitude of recent
Dow 30 moves is exactly on target with those of the early 1970s.
This secular sideways grind,
the Curse of the Trading Range, happens because stock valuations
were far too high to be sustained at the last valuation crest
so they need to drop back to fair levels. The long way to do
this is to have stocks slowly move sideways over many years until
earnings can catch up with high stock prices. But Valuation
Wave Reversions are problematic because they don't conveniently
stop at 14x fair value. They overshoot on the downside and ultimately
end near 7x earnings at the next valuation wave trough.
The Dow 30 interim top P/E
ratios since 2000 that are shown above in yellow drive home this
point. At its 2000 peak the Dow traded at an absolutely unsustainable
44.7x earnings! By May 2001 it was again near 11350 on the index,
but its valuation had dropped dramatically to 27.6x earnings.
By March 2004 after the initial war rally upleg it was back near
26.1x earnings, but by March 2005 at even higher index levels
valuations had again dropped considerably to 21.4x.
And as of early May, the Dow
30's P/E has dropped to 18.7x, not too far above fair value,
even though it was once again challenging all-time nominal highs.
The markets are definitely valuation mean reverting! While I
am happy to see the stock markets a lot less overvalued than
they were in 2000, extreme caution is still in order here. When
a valuation wave is receding, it never stops at fair value. The
Dow is not just going to 14x and then a new bull erupts. It is
almost certainly going far lower to 7x earnings.
A perfect example of the reason
stock investors today should not be anywhere close to being smug
and complacent happened during the last great bear. In early
1973, roughly just 6 months ahead in comparable trading-range-time
terms of our latest peak last month, the Dow 30 was trading at
just 18.7x earnings and yielding 2.7% in dividends. But even
though these valuations were getting reasonable, over the next
two years into the end of 1974 the Dow 30 plunged.
The unbelievably vicious cyclical
bear market that ignited in 1973 and 1974 was one of the most
psychologically devastating episodes in market history. The Dow
went from roughly 1050 to 575 in two years, about a 45% loss.
For the majority of buy-and-hold investors, this was the key
psychological turning point that shattered their resolve. Late
1974 is when investors started to hate stocks. If you are a long-term
investor in general US stocks, imagine how you would feel two
years from now if the Dow 30 is back under 7000.
Well, ominously if the US stock
markets continue following the last great bear's script today,
we are now at the highest risk yet of seeing a multi-year cyclical
bear ending in a sub-7000 Dow. Visually above, note the amazing
similarities between the awesome cyclical bull from 1970 to the
end of 1972 and the equally magnificent last several years in
the US markets. If the modern date scale was shifted six months
to the right, this comparison would be even more uncanny.
Also note that just before
the brutal mid-1970s cyclical bear started prowling, the Dow
was trading at 18.7x earnings and yielding 2.7% in dividends
in late 1972. These numbers are remarkably similar to what we
saw this month, 16.5x and 2.5%. Obviously anything can happen
in the markets and today's stock markets don't have to follow
the dark mid-1970s course, but investors ought to still take
this potential risk very seriously.
Here we are, more than 6 years
after the last Long Valuation Wave crest in 2000, and the evidence
continues growing that we are in another long-trading-range great-bear
scenario. If I was a long-term buy-and-hold general-stock investor,
this increasingly ominous trading range would make we want to
cry. Thankfully there is a far better alternative than suffering
another decade of real losses in a brutal sideways grind.
During these great stock bears
in market history, commodities tend to thrive. Commodities also
run on third-of-a-century-or-so
cycles but they are offset 180 degrees. When stocks are in
a secular bull commodities are usually in a secular bear and
vice versa. Even during the last long trading range of the 1970s
stocks of primary commodities producers soared. Stocks of giant
producers often had 10x+ gains during this period and stocks
of more speculative smaller commodities producers witnessed plenty
of 100x+ gains!
At Zeal we think it is pointless
to try and fight a receding Long Valuation Wave so we have focused
our research efforts since 2000 on profitably investing and speculating
in the unfolding Great
Commodities Bull. While the Dow 30 may still be pathetically
languishing near 11000 a decade from now, great commodities stocks
are almost certainly going to be at least an order of magnitude
higher than they are today.
Long-term stock investors can
park capital in the stocks of elite commodities producers, earn
huge gains while weathering the general-stock secular bear, and
have great sums of capital ready to buy general-stock bargains
when the next valuation wave trough arrives. If you'd like to
learn more about specific commodities stocks opportunities that
are likely to thrive as this commodities bull continues to power
higher, please
subscribe to our acclaimed monthly
newsletter today.
The bottom line is the evidence
continues to mount that we are now sojourning through another
long trading range in the general stock markets. While speculators
can capitalize on this and trade the massive cyclical swings
inherent in such a sideways valuation reversion, buy-and-hold
investors will likely get slaughtered. If you think that buying
and holding the biggest and best American companies is always
a sure thing, think again. Beware the Curse of the Trading Range!
Thankfully while stock markets
are suffering though great bears the commodities are usually
surging in their own great bulls. Thus a prudent buy-and-hold
investor has a far higher probability of success over the next
decade if he deploys his capital in elite major commodities-producer
stocks rather than long-range-bound general stocks.
Adam Hamilton, CPA
May 26, 2006
Thoughts, comments, or flames? Fire away at zelotes@zealllc.com. Due to my staggering and perpetually increasing e-mail load, I regret that I am not able to respond to comments personally. I will read all messages though and really appreciate your feedback!
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