Why Euroland's streets aren't paved
with gold
part 2 of 2
Mark Griffith
Jul 8, 2005
People rarely abandon habits
overnight, or all at once, and followers of gold-euro coupling
are no different. For a pair of years high dollar has meant low
euro and low gold - while low dollar has meant high euro and
high gold. A number of analysts saw this pattern break in the
last few weeks. Now the pattern seems to be back for a while.
Old patterns like the gold-euro
coupling have a repeating persistence that works a lot like price
levels themselves.
Take a price level - such as
400 dollars an ounce for gold - or even other, less-studied
price levels like 427 dollars an ounce.
When breaking through a price
level, the old price level first acts like a ceiling, then like
a floor - but in both cases it's like a ceiling or a floor made
of sticky rubber.
The patterns of price behaviour
are familiar. Rallies go up through the level, some distance
beyond, then stall.... as if being pulled back by the sticky,
stretching threads of a spider's web not letting a fly get away.
The same thing happens the other way round - a price going down
seems to penetrate, then slows, then stops, then starts to move
back - not unlike a slow-motion trampoline.
Likewise, the linkage with
the euro is going to be with gold awhile. Sometimes it will break
away, sometimes it will seem to be sucked back into the coupling.
The long-term prospects for
both dollar and euro are weak, but the market will take time
to arrive, however slowly, at a consensus that both their prospects
are weak against something else in particular (such as gold).
Expect gold to mainly shine in weeks when there is no good news
about either currency bloc.
Many readers responded to Part
1 of this article. Some, quite rightly, pulled me up about two
points. One was the idea some readers got that I think the euro
is not a weak currency. It is weak, just in a different way to
the dollar. While overspending the US economic boom has allowed
the dollar to float up and out of reach, the artificially stiff
euro currency has pushed the Euroland economy down. Both are
overvalued, just from different directions, as it were.
Furthermore, after a decade
of unemployment-led currency "hardness" in what was
to become Euroland, the currency is now being overborrowed surreptitiously
by some members - witness the wangle clauses by some member states
breaking their own rules about debt as a ratio of national income.
This gives us the interesting
prospect of an artificially "hard" currency maintaining
high interest rates at the same time as some members are borrowing
under the table, so to speak. Since this makes it almost certain
that one or more aggrieved countries will pull out of the euro
sooner or later, the euro is a very unreliable bet long-term.
The interest-deals that will be done to prevent an Italy or a
France or a Greece from jumping ship will, of course, be a bigger
problem for holders of the currency and of euro-denominated debt
than the actual departure of one or two countries.
Emotional insecurity reigns,
however, in Euroland. Once one country leaves the euro, as one
will sooner or later, discussion will be intense as to "who
is leaving next". Eurocrats are terrified of this, because
deep down they suspect their project is little more than a conjuring
trick between several bureaucracy-heavy countries who don't quite
cut it in international-trade terms.
Yet it need not be such a big
deal if a country leaves. Why should a country or two not leave,
and another country or two join, Euroland each year? But when
a club cannot bear to even talk about members thinking of leaving...
that tells you how fragile the whole structure feels from the
inside.
Which is why we can expect
membership of the euro, and the terms countries have to satisfy
to stay in it, to be very much made of sticky rubber, stretching
whichever way they have to, to keep the whole crumbly deal together.
If you want to bet on high interest rates for the PIGS (Portugal,
Italy, Greece, Spain, for those readers who never worked in the
flippantly rude world of London banking), then I'd like to bet
against you. A credible threat to leave the euro will turn any
interest-rate agreement to jelly. If you want to bet on low interest
rates for more depressed Euroland economies like Germany or Holland,
I'd like to bet against you too. With a currency designed to
please everyone and destined to please no-one, sooner or later
all things will come to pass.
Yet the stateist instincts
of Eurolanders are unlikely to turn them into raging gold bulls
any time soon, as I said in Part
1.
As one astute reader pointed
out, French people have a very high rate of ownership of physical
gold by international standards - many of them have a healthy
suspicion of anyone calling themselves an official. This dates
from the extraordinary episode in the early 18th century where
a clever Scottish adventurer, John Law, persuaded the
French King to issue paper promissory notes in whichever
quantities (eventually) suited the crown.
This remarkable paper inflation
disaster did three things of interest.
1. It created the French word
"millionaire", used in English and lots of other languages
even today, as some speculators became fantastically rich almost
overnight in France's own version of Tulip Mania. 2. It so severely
damaged the French crown and popular trust in the monarchy that
the path was smoothed for the French Revolution a few decades
later.
3. It left a portion of the
French nation with a deep affection for gold, and a lasting distrust
of any kind of money printed on paper - hence the surprise of
one alert reader at my claim that Euroland is not ripe for a
massive move into gold.
The difficulties with the idea
that Eurolanders are gold bugs just waiting to happen are several
though. The wise minority of Frenchmen who still hoard gold under
their beds (and a few really do just that) is smaller than it
used to be, and to some extent this is already in the market.
This section of (largely provincial) France is already holding
about as much physical gold as they can afford to. They're not
all about to buy tons more.
Worse, Euroland's governments
are able and willing to tax or regulate these and other people
from acquiring assets in other kinds of gold (certificates of
deposit, futures and options contracts, shares in gold mines).
This "paper gold" sector is bigger than physical gold,
and is a lot more practical as a route for thousands of small
investors to quickly increase their exposure to precious metals
- a lot simpler than getting some ingots to put in the attic,
though there is nothing wrong with that of course.
It may sound paradoxical to
say on a website that criticises over-reliance on paper money
that paper versions of gold allow more people to move more money
into gold more quickly than physical ownership, but that's how
it is. Unfortunately, there is a matching cost. Paper gold can
be tied up out of citizens' reach with government red tape a
lot more easily.
Oddly, the distrust of paper
money among Eurolanders with good memories directly led to the
belief that the euro should be made credible with over-high interest
rates. That currency still looks crisp on the outside, but is
increasingly soft on the inside: an unattractive monetary version
of the marshmallow. What started out as a currency too soft for
the Germans and too hard for the Mediterranean PIGS, is turning
inside out. If Mediterranean state and local-authority borrowers
keep on borrowing at attractively low rates while growth continues
to stall in the Nordic and Germanic members of Euroland, they
will find themselves, bizarrely, with something too hard to let
the Germans invest to restart economic growth and too soft to
restrain the PIGS borrowing until they're in over their heads.
However, I sound too pessimistic.
As yet another reader prompted me - is there not room for re-education
in Euroland? The general attitude on large swathes of the European
continent (that all prosperity really comes from government and
belongs to government in turn) means that the general attitude
will continue to be: our governments have messed up the currency
- they must now make a better currency for us in its place.
This is after all a continent
of people who find compulsory state-issued identity cards as
natural as breathing. These are mainly people who simply refuse
to believe that sophisticated countries (like Britain and the
US) can actually have lower crime rates and more of the world's
money entrusted to their banks without everyone being safely
tagged by state officials.
Perhaps I overstated. Even
Europeans can learn, and one per cent of one per cent is a lot
of people - should that many even ring up their bank to find
out about shifting into gold. Still, there are larger games in
town. Major progress is more likely to come from US institutions
losing interest in the gold-euro coupling, and being ready to
sell euros and buy gold.
Think of the now-partly-repaired
gold-euro link as an opportunity in disguise, a breathing space
giving us time to prepare. Gold may follow the euro down during
opportunistic selling based on the dollar suddenly looking less
bad than it did. But wait until genuinely bad news hits Euroland's
currency, enough to unwind some of the world's already-large
reserve-currency positions in euros. When the slow unravel of
Euroland becomes finally, undeniably visible - that will be the
time to have those gold call options already in place.
The euro going suddenly through
a significant floor will break the link, shift reserve-currency
money into the precious metal, and ramp up gold like nothing
since the 1980s. Not because Euroland is economically sick (it
is not bursting with health, but it makes some good stuff and
is not about to turn into Ethiopia), but because the instrument
itself, the euro, is at times deeply uncomfortable for some of
the countries in Euroland, and it is only a matter of time before
one of them refuses to bear the discomfort and shrugs it off.
It will be mainly non-European
money shifting into gold (hence the title of this article), but
a true who-is-going-to-leave-this-week crisis for the euro will
be an opportunity for gold like no other on the horizon. Cloudy
old Europe will by and large persist in trusting official fiat
currency. But that same trust will sooner or later cause a Euroland
political crisis. Study carefully and wait patiently. That political
crisis - however short-lived - is going to be more than a silver
lining for speculators.
Mark Griffith
email: markgriffith@yahoo.com
Mark Griffith
has a BA in Economics and Philosophy from Cambridge University,
England; has traded in the open-outcry futures and options pits
of LIFFE, London; has been published by Forbes Magazine, Financial
Times newsletters, Playboy Russia, and American Spectator.
He writes about
commodity markets and finance, and is researching a book about
how firms can profit from virtual currencies. He can be contacted
at markgriffith@yahoo.com.
321gold Inc
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