What's a Company's Gold Worth?
Louis James & Andrey Dashkov
Casey's
International Speculator
Jan 31, 2010
At any given time, there's a single international
spot price for an ounce of refined gold. Gold is priced in U.S.
dollars: $1,076.50 per ounce as we go to press. But what about
the gold an exploration or mining company has in the ground -
how do we value that?
Given sufficient data, you can estimate a reasonable net present
value (NPV) for a project and deduce what each of the company's
ounces should be worth. To do this, you need to know annual
output of the proposed mine, proposed capital expenditures, energy
and other costs, and many more things. For most deposits held
by the junior companies we tend to follow, there's just not enough
data available.
Another approach is to compare the value the market is giving
a company per ounce of gold in hand against the average value
the market gives companies with similar ounces.
The most obvious way to define "similar" ounces in
the ground is to use the three resource and two mining reserve
categories defined by Canada's National Instrument NI43-101 regulations
- the industry standard. We combine these into three broad groups,
as we believe the market tends to do as well:
- Inferred:
the lowest-confidence category, based on just enough drilling
to outline the mineralization.
.
- Measured & Indicated (M&I): these higher-confidence categories have been
drilled enough to establish their geometry and continuity reasonably
well.
.
- Proven & Probable (P&P): These are bankable mining reserves - basically
Measure and Indicated resources with established value.
So, what does the market give a company,
on average, for an Inferred ounce of gold? M&I? P&P?
To answer this, we combed through every company listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V)
and pulled out the ones with 43-101-compliant gold resource estimates
(or mostly gold) - no silver, copper, etc. Of these, we kept
only those with resources that fall almost entirely into only
one of our three broad groups: Inferred, M&I, and P&P.
In other words, we did not include companies with half Inferred
and half M&I resources (though we did include companies with
mostly P&P reserves, because most are producers - or soon
will be - and are regarded that way). That left us with about
90 companies to calculate some averages on.
That's not a large sampling universe, and we had to make some
judgment calls when it came to defining what companies should
fall in each category, but it's what we have. So take these averages
with a large grain of rock salt, but here they are:
- US$20
per ounce Inferred
.
- US$30 per
ounce for M&I
.
- US$160 per
ounce for P&P
Armed with this information, if you didn't
know anything else about an M&I resource (political risk,
type of ore, etc.), but you saw that the company that owned it
was trading at $10 per ounce, whereas its peers are valued at
around $30 an ounce, you can conclude that there must either
be something very wrong with the project or the stock is a great
speculation. If there's nothing wrong with the project, there's
an implied growth potential in the stock price, based
on the difference between what the company is getting per ounce
and the market average for similar ounces. In this case, it would
be:
$20 x # Ounces ÷ # shares.
As a matter of perspective, a few years ago the market was
giving a company about $25 per ounce Inferred, $50 for M&I,
and about $100 for P&P. Then, when gold ran up over $1,000
before the crash of 2008, these valuations went out the window,
and some companies were getting over $100 for merely Inferred
ounces - do we have your attention now?
Conversely, just after the crash, there were companies having
a hard time getting $10 for M&I. That was clearly a sign
that it was time to buy, and we did, with gusto.
It's also why, when the Mania phase gets underway, we'll be selling
into it as gold approaches the top; we will not be attempting
to time the top. It's far better in this business to be a day
early than a day late.
Today, the market is willing to pay more for advanced and producing
stories ($160 P&P) but is discounting earlier-stage stories,
hence the lower M&I valuation than in previous years ($30).
These figures will change again as the market's appetite for
risk changes.
Now let's compare these numbers to those of a few sample gold
companies. This table includes the market capitalizations (share
price x # shares) of our sample gold companies expressed in USD
(because that's what gold is priced in), not the usual CAD. The
second column has the value of each company's resources, as per
the average numbers given above (i.e., [# Inf. ounces x $20]
+ [# M&I ounces x $30] +[# P&P ounces x $160]). The implied
growth is a simple ratio of these two numbers, expressed as a
percentage.
Gabriel and Coral Gold look pretty cheap,
Luiri slightly expensive, but in most cases there are good reasons
for this. For example, these averages by confidence category
ignore the typically greater cost of extracting gold from low-grade
sulfide ore, as compared to high-grade oxide ore.
We don't follow the companies in the
table above -- they are just examples -- but here's our take
on their implied growth ratios:
- LGL:
Luiri's flagship Luiri Hill project, located in Zambia's Central
Province, has only 800,000 ounces in total resource, 82% of which
fall within the least reliable Inferred category.
.
Although the current resource estimate is based on lower-grade
material, the company's gold looks fairly valued. However, LGL
is working to define more high-grade areas of mineralization
both within and outside the resource boundaries, and not without
success. For example, drilling from the Matala deposit, lying
in the heart of Luiri Hill, has delivered high-grade intercepts
from the central shallow zones, like the recently published 21.1
g/t Au over 5.6 m (starting from 56 m), including 41.1 g/t Au
over 2.8 m (starting from 56 m of the same hole #114).
.
Conclusion:
The company looks a bit expensive at the moment, probably because
the market sees Luiri's upside potential coming from the new
high-grade ounces being added in forthcoming resource estimates.
If the marker were underestimating how much gold Luiri might
be adding, it could still be a good speculation, but you'd have
to be pretty sure of your calculations projecting that greater
value to be added soon.
.
- GBU:
Gabriel Resources appears undervalued when using average ounce
prices, plus there is a lot of upside outlined in the economic
study on the company's Rosia Montana project in Romania, released
last March. The study suggests excellent project economics, including
low cash cost (US$335/oz), after-tax NPV of almost 1 billion
USD at 5% discount, and after-tax IRR of 20.4%, all at an uber-conservative
US$750/oz base case gold price.
.
However, the company was sued by environmentalists in September
2007 and suffered regulatory setbacks. GBU shares tanked, and
this is why the company's gold is still selling at a discount;
there is high political risk. Gabriel's share price has soared
recently on words of support from the government officials, but
it's still perceived - rightly - as high-risk. If Rosia Montana
gets permitted to go into production, GBU shares should make
very rapid gains.
.
Conclusion:
The government of Romania has made supportive noises about Rosia
Montana before, to no avail, and the company doesn't appear screamingly
cheap right now, so the risk-to-reward ratio looks too high to
us.
.
- CLH:
The company is focused on the Robertson project located on the
Cortez Trend in Nevada. Coral Gold has recently revised the project's
resource estimate at $850/oz gold (which looks fairly conservative,
given the recent price action) to 3.4 million ounces, all Inferred.
Our guidelines suggest that these ounces should be worth about
US$68 million. Mind you, this gold is contained within what CLH
believes to be well-known Carlin-type mineralization in a mining-friendly
jurisdiction. Why does the market value these ounces way cheaper
then?
.
We think it's a metallurgy issue. Lacking sufficient metallurgical
data from all Robertson targets, CLH used numbers from a deposit
called 39A to stand in for the whole project. The problem is
that 39A is one of the deeper Robertson deposits, and large-scale
heap leach operation, the preferred scenario for Robertson, showed
high strip ratio, which would probably result in high capital
expenditures and operating costs.
.
Conclusion:
Robertson ounces are cheap due to valid concerns over the project's
economics. If the company can fix these problems, its resources
could be revalued upward dramatically.
Bottom Line
We often get asked what an Inferred,
or M&I, or P&P ounce is worth in the ground. The $20,
$30, and $160 figures are only rough guides, and you must consider
the reasons why some ounces are given more or less by the market,
but they're a good starting point.
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International Speculator so different from other investment
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as well.
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here.
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Jan 29, 2010
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