Benson's Economic
& Market Trends
Swim With the Sharks but
Risk Being Eaten Alive
Richard Benson
Jul 27, 2007
Private companies that lend
their own money are generally very careful with their loan underwriting,
and they know how to collect the money they lend. Most reputable
finance companies use simple accounting procedures and have adequate
loan reserves, and conservative financial leverage. These firms
generally understand derivatives and don't rely on them to manufacture
profits. They're not sharks.
This article is not about the
private companies that use sound lending practices. It's about
the many big financial players, the giant hedge funds, major
money center banks, and Watt Street Investment banks. These
are the "Big Boy Sharks" who created $2 trillion in
subprime mortgages, using hubris and Gordon Gekko-style greed,
and have recklessly used leverage and risk with other peoples'
money to book corporate profits. A typical example of this is
the over-levered Bear Stearns hedge funds investing in crappy
mortgage securities that have now left many investors scratching
their heads while they search for answers as to why their equity
vanished overnight.
Are the codes of conduct being abused by the credit rating agencies
when they effectively "sell their souls" to rate untested
mortgage product in unproven financial structures? Should investors
look askance at the mono-line bond insurance companies that are
backing about $2 trillion dollars in asset-backed, mortgage-backed
and other securities? How else could the Big Boys get away with
it?
To fully grasp the risk for
the financial sector, it's important to understand how finance
companies make money. For finance, the greatest profit engine
of all time has been the ability to take advantage of a positively
sloped yield curve. Long-term interest rates are usually significantly
higher than short-term. If you borrow short and lend long, you
can make an interest spread of two percent on the 10-year Treasury,
with no credit risk at all. However, over the last year and
a half, the yield curve has been flat or inverted and the Fed
Funds rate of five and a quarter percent is actually above the
10-year Treasury yield of five percent! This means that the
greatest profit engine for banks and finance is totally out of
gas.
Another big profit engine for
banks and finance is borrowing at a highly rated credit rating,
and investing at a lower credit rating. The difference between
the high rated cost of funds, and the lower rated investment
yield, is called the "credit spread". For the past
few years, credit spreads have set a new record for being the
least profitable ever recorded! A flat yield curve and
narrow credit spreads are usually a disaster for bank and finance
company earnings. You would think that the right time for finance
companies to be minting money is when the yield curve is steep
and the credit spreads are wide, not now during times like these.
So, why are the Big Boys still
reporting record profits? It's actually easy, with a combination
of the following: 1) Taking on unprecedented risk by exploding
up the size of the balance sheet; 2) Adding massive amounts of
leverage, including hidden leverage through derivatives; 3) Robbing
loan loss reserves; and 4) Playing accounting games that allow
earnings to be booked today at the expense of losses tomorrow.
Included in the unprecedented
risk category is when these same financial firms switch to the
foreign carry trade. Big carry trade profits can be achieved
by borrowing in a low interest rate foreign currency (such as
the Yen). As long as the Yen declines in value, a fortune can
be made borrowing below one percent interest, and investing in
U.S. financial assets yielding much more. However, this trade
is placed and highly leveraged and if the Yen ever goes up against
the dollar, the carry trade losses will make the subprime fiasco
appear like a minor footnote in history.
On-balance-sheet leverage has
also reached new heights. If a financial institution makes nothing
on borrowing short and lending long (and credit spreads are cut
in half just to keep profits the same), the firm will have to
double its leverage, which means twice the risk! Even so, the
Big Boys have exploded the size of their balance sheets and are
funding massive positions in securities with short-term "repurchase
agreements" in the money market. (Many of the securities
funded are just like those in the subprime mortgage hedge funds
where the security can't find a buyer who will make a bid in
the market.) These securities have value recorded on the
balance sheet because a trader or portfolio manager, with a fancy
financial model, says they have value, not because the market
says they do. These balance sheets are like sandwiches filled
with hundreds of billions of dollars of "mystery meat".
This over-leveraged and frequently rotting meat is something
you really wouldn't want to eat. It smells.
Many lenders who have not adequately
deducted loss reserves from earnings for credit losses have,
instead, goosed their earnings by short-changing the loss reserves.
These same lenders also continue to reward their executives
by paying them large bonuses and allowing them to cash out their
stock options. It's really all about booking a profit today,
and telling you about the losses tomorrow.
In the derivatives world, credit
derivatives are the new new thing. Very simply put, a credit
derivative - known as a Credit Default Swap or "CDS"
- is when the insured pays a premium (like any insurance policy)
and if the credit goes belly up, the insurance pays off. Today,
there are tens of trillions of dollars in notional credit derivatives,
and all of the big players have become sharks with their use
of these derivatives.
For financial institutions,
CDSs are a way of making a credit bet (just like making a loan)
without the inconvenience of putting any real money up or having
to place the loan on the balance sheet, that would require equity.
Indeed, there are now about 10 CDSs written for each and every
corporate bond that actually exists! That means that 90 percent
of the business is pure speculation because it is not hedged
by someone who owns a bond or loan. Most of the CDS business
is simply a way for the Big Boys to place big bets with no money
down. Remember, if you own the stocks of big financial institutions,
they are gambling with your money.
Why is all this Big Boy betting
going on? Just like the accounting for subprime mortgages, the
financial institution gets to value the instrument they created.
Accounting for derivatives allows both the seller and buyer of
the insurance to pretend that the financial institution isn't
gambling at all, as both get to book a profit!
The seller of the credit
default insurance can claim "I know the credit will never
default; I can book the premium I collect as pure profit and
don't need to book a loss reserve." At the same time, the
buyer of the credit default insurance can claim "The credit
will default within a few years so I can amortize my profit,
net of the premium I paid, to my expected date of default."
The best analogy would be to
picture watching a poker game and around the table are the biggest
Wall Street Sharks. A lot of chips are on the table and depending
on the accounting treatment used, each player would claim to
have won the entire pot even though the last cards have yet to
be dealt. The problem is, those cards will be dealt eventually
and someone is going to have to book a loss. In this type of
poker game, if you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy!
A number of investors in some big subprime mortgage hedge funds
just found this out.
The accounting treatment used
in each credit default swap derivative is, unfortunately, not
the same. For each and every derivative, each player gets to
build their own fancy computer model and mark the value of their
credit default swaps, or similar securities, to the model. Since
the bonuses that the traders receive are based on what they show
to be their profit, human nature and a combination of hubris
and greed lead to massively over-optimistic and self-serving
modeling, instead of an honest value "mark to market".
Think sausages. We all know
they taste great yet we don't dare ask how they're made or what's
in them. The major rating agencies and accounting firms have
been the helpful and highly paid facilitators in the making of
the sausage. Profits at the Big Boy houses look great, too,
at the end of the quarter but if you saw how these profits were
actually made, you might have reconsidered your investment.
Don't count on the accountants or rating agencies to even take
a look, until the Sharks have eaten and everyone sees the blood
in the water.
For the past couple of years,
40 percent of profits in the S&P 500 have come from financing
activities, and financial profits have a long way to fall just
to get back to historical averages. Remember, the U.S. economy
has been driven by the financial system which has created an
unprecedented level of debt. For those of you celebrating when
the Dow edged up toward 14,000 and the S&P 500 hit a new
record high, you may find the next celebration a long time coming.
The recent stock market slide is caused primarily by worries
over credit quality and excess leverage. The problems are just
beginning.
The high level of risk in the
financial sector is one major reason why I buy gold and silver.
Remember, these precious metals have no accounting games attached
to them. That gold coin in your hand won't go bust and suddenly
vanish into thin air!
Jul 26, 2007
Richard Benson
Archives
President
Specialty
Finance Group, LLC
Member FINRA/SIPC
2505 S. Ocean Boulevard
- Suite 212
Palm Beach, Florida 33480
1 800-860-2907
email: rbenson@sfgroup.org
Richard Benson, SFGroup, is a widely-published
author on securitization and specialty finance, and a sought after
speaker at financing conferences on raising equity for mid-market
companies.
Prior to founding
the Specialty Finance Group in 1989, Mr. Benson acted as a trading
desk economist for Chase Manhattan Bank in the early 1980's and
started in the securitization business in 1983 at Bear Stearns,
and helped build the early securitization businesses at Citibank
and E.F. Hutton.
Mr. Benson graduated
from the University of Wisconsin in 1970 in the Honors Program
in Math, and did his doctoral work in Economics at Harvard University.
Mr. Benson is a member of the Harvard Club of New York and Palm
Beach.
The Specialty
Finance Group, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company and
is registered with FINRA/SIPC as a Broker/Dealer.
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